Question Two. Whether for the Period of any Law Given by God Some Sacrament Needed to Have Been Instituted

217. Now that the quiddity of a sacrament has been got I ask, as to a sacrament’s institution, whether some sacrament needed to have been instituted for the period of any law given by God.

218. That no:

Because we do not read [in Sacred Scripture] about any sacrament instituted by God for the period of the law of nature; but a sacrament, according to its definition [n.207], can only be instituted by God;     therefore etc     . There is a confirmation from Gregory Moralia 4, preface n.3: “What the water of baptism among us is able to do was done among the ancients by faith alone for children, and by the virtue of sacrifice for adults;” therefore there was no sacrament among the ancients. But the idea of a sacrament against disease seems in any law to be more necessary than anything else.

219. Again, God is not the cause of sin for man nor does he directly give man occasion for sin; but that ‘there is salvation in sensible realities’ is directly an occasion for sin, namely because it is an occasion for believing that there is something divine in such sensible things, and so it is an occasion for idolatry; therefore God did not institute anything sensible so that in it or through it salvation needed to be sought.

220. Again, God did not give any law immediately but through a minister. This is plain of the Law of Moses through the whole of it; therefore similarly in the Law of the

Gospel it seems that the sacrament could have been instituted or ordained by a minister, and not necessarily immediately by God.

221. Again, since many laws were given by God, then if in the time of any law a sacrament was instituted by God, different sacraments would have been instituted at different times; for if the sacrament of a prior law had remained at the time of a later law, no other sacrament would have been instituted for the later law. But the consequent is unacceptable, because once a spoken word has been imposed by us for signifying something, it remains significative of that same thing. Therefore, much more does a sign once imposed by God remain always significative of the same thing.

222. On the contrary: Augustine Against Faustus 19 ch.11, “men cannot be conjoined under any title of religion unless they are brought together by some agreement of visible signs or sacraments.”

I. To the Question

223. Here four things must be considered: first that some sacrament did need to be instituted; second by whom, because it is immediately from God; third when, because it is for the time of any state of a wayfarer after the Fall; fourth, whether there were different sacraments for the state of different laws.

A. Some Sacrament Did Need to be Instituted

224. About the first I say that ‘some sacrament needs to be instituted’ cannot be proved with necessity: not a priori because God does nothing necessarily outside himself; nor a posteriori, or from the end, because an invisible effect could be had without a sacramental sign.

225. But that it was fitting for a sacrament to be instituted is proved by a reason similar to the one set down in the preceding question [nn.190-193], where the possibility of a sacrament was proved.

226. For it is fitting that an invisible effect, ordaining man to salvation and in need of being caused by God, be signified by some sensible thing, so that the wayfarer, acquiring knowledge of it from sensible things, might come to know the invisible effect more certainly.

227. Nor is a fitting sign of this sort of effect only a quasi theoretical one, namely one by which a concept of the thing signified (as ‘man’ signifies human nature) could be got, but a fitting sign is also a quasi practical one, namely one that signifies that the thing signified is or is coming to be.

228. Nor further is a doubtful or equivocal or uncertain practical sign a fitting sign; for although a man might be led by such a sign to knowledge of the coming to be of this sort of effect, yet he would not desire the sign to be applied to himself because of the uncertainty of the sign in respect of the coming to be of the thing signified. Therefore it was fitting for such an effect to be signified by a certain and efficacious practical sign, so that man too might know the effect from such a sign and might more ardently seek after the effect in that sign.

229. But it is not fitting that the sign be certain with the certitude of demonstration, but that it be so as it were for the most part. For just as in theoretical matters there is a sign that is necessary and a sign holding for the most part (from Posterior Analytics 1.30.87b19-25), so could a practical sign have as it were necessary certitude, if it universally and as it were necessarily accompanies the coming to be of the effect, or a certitude for the most part, if it accompanies the effect for the most part.

It is not fitting that a sensible sign be certain in the first way, because since a sensible sign needs to be applied by man, it would follow that there would be in man’s power some sign upon which God would universally cause the invisible effect; and this would take away due preparation from the receiver, since it would be sufficient for him to receive the sign however indisposed he was.

But it is fitting for such invisible effect to be signified by a sensible sign that is certain with certitude for the most part, that is to say always, unless the indisposition of the received prevent it - and this is fittingly signified by a sign naturally preceding the coming to be of the thing signified, so that thus the receiving of the sign would be as it were a disposition for the thing signified.

230. All these conditions of a sign, namely that it be practical, certain for the most part, and naturally preceding the coming to be of the thing signified, I understand to be meant by the term ‘efficacious’. But such a sign cannot be any sensible thing that signifies naturally, because nothing sensible has a natural efficacy for an invisible effect. Therefore it is fitting for the sign to be instituted or imposed.

231. In this way, therefore, one gets (according to the whole idea of a sacrament) that it was fitting for a sacrament to be instituted to cause knowledge and desire in the wayfarer in respect of the invisible effect.

232. And this is one of the ideas of a sacrament that the Master touches on in the text, namely ‘for teaching’. He touches on the other two ideas in the text, namely for ‘exercise and humility’, whose explication he touches on in the text. And these three ideas of a sacrament establish the nature of a sacrament’s institution, on the part of any private person.

233. But there is another idea that touches on fittingness on the part of the whole community. For it is fitting for men of one sect to come together under some exterior signs, by which too they may be distinguished from those of another sect; for by such signs a man knows who is of his sect and who of a different sect. And this is expedient, because those who know themselves to be of the same sect aid each other mutually in the observance of it, and those who know themselves to be of a dissimilar sect mutually avoid each other as mutually impeding each other. Now it is expedient that such a sign, uniting those who are of the same sect and distinguishing them from others, be practical with respect to some visible effect pertaining to observance of the sect.

234. It is plain, therefore, that not necessity [n.224] but fittingness can be proved by reason [nn.225-233].

235. The fact, however, is proved by authority, as will be touched on in the fourth article [n.343], because authorities do not speak of a sacrament taken universally (as it is still being treated here), but speak specifically of such and such a sacrament of such and such a law.

B. By Whom a Sacrament Needs to be Instituted

236. On the second point [n.223] I say that from one source a practical sign gets its signifying practically the thing signified, and from another source its being a certain sign.

237. The thing is clear because it is possible sometimes for someone who is not truthful to use the sign, for a sign gets its signification from previous institution; but that the sign is certain only comes from the determination of someone who cooperates with the sign to signify the thing caused. For example, if the touching of the hand is instituted as a sign of peace by some legislator in his polity, then, although the sign gets from this imposition that it does signify peace practically, yet if someone not truthful can use the sign, imposition of it by the legislator does not make the sign certain but it remains equivocal, being sometimes true (when it has the thing signified concomitant with it) and sometimes false. For someone false uses the sign without what it signifies (as one might use a theoretical sign of kindness without the thing signified, by saying ‘I give you my affection’ when one sometimes has the opposite in mind).

238. As to the issue in hand: a sacrament also signifies practically that a practical effect is caused in him to whom it is applied; and thus it signifies that it is a sign certain for the most part or by general rule, as far as concerns the sign.

239. But as to the signification, it is possible that it might be instituted by a creature, because just as a man could impose a theoretical sign of an effect of God (as is plain in the prayer ‘May God give grace to your soul’), so he could impose a sign that would signify practically that God is working invisibly. But a man could not make that sign certain as a matter of rule; for no one can give certitude to any practical sign save he in whose power it is to be able to cause the thing signified by the sign. But only God can determine himself to cause an effect proper to himself; therefore only God can give certitude to a sign, a practical sign, of his own effect.

240. Thus, therefore, it is plain that a sacrament can, as to its being a sign that is certain, only be instituted by God.

241. But insofar as it is a practical sign absolutely it could be instituted by someone else. But it is not fitting so, because the institution of such a sign would be altogether vain: never could the sign get truth from the imposition without someone else from the outside, for the sign is not in the power of the one who imposed or uses it. Nor is it fitting that God should hand over to an inferior the institution of a sacrament insofar as it is a sign that is certain, lest God be an approver of a false or equivocal sign.

242. However, a sign, as it is a sign and as it is a certain sign, can be promulgated by someone other than God, as by a herald. This promulgation, however, is not institution but presupposes institution.

243. Hence it is plain whether a sacrament has its efficacy from institution. For if institution be understood precisely as imposition of a practical sign, then I say it does not get efficacy from its institution, as is plain from what has been said [nn.239-240]. But if institution be understood as a determination of the will of the institutor to cooperate with the thing signified, which institution is not simply imposition of a practical sign but is, along with this, an establishing of the sign as true and certain, then in this way a sacrament does get efficacy from its institution, namely because the thing signified does accompany the sign.

244. And just as in man’s case there would be really one act whereby he determined a kiss to be a sign of reconciliation and another act whereby he determined his will, when the sign was given, to cause what was signified, so in God’s case too there is one act of reason instituting a sensible sign for signifying practically God’s effect, and another act whereby he determines himself really to cooperate with such sign as a matter of rule or always, namely when lack of disposition in the receiver does not get in the way. However these two acts, when concurring together, can be called one complete institution of the sacrament, insofar as a sacrament is a sign that is certain and that is distinct from an equivocal sign.

245. But if this does belong to the idea of a sacrament, as seems to be so from the term ‘efficacious’ [nn.192, 230], then it follows that there belongs to the idea of a sacrament properly speaking that it can only be instituted by God. But if this does not belong to the idea of a sacrament, because whether the thing signified accompanies the sign or not is accidental to the sign, then at least this perfection (the perfection that is its truth or conformity in signifying the thing signified [nn.192, 241]) requires, when added to the idea of a sacrament, that a sacrament be instituted by God, or that God determine himself to cooperate with the sign as a matter of rule.

C. When or for What Period there was Need for a Sacrament to be Instituted

246. The answer to the third article is plain from the first [nn.225-226, 237-238]. For medicine is necessary for any state where there is sickness; and for any state of life (especially after the fall) it is fitting for man to be led to invisible things through some sensible sign. But in every state of life after the fall there is sickness in nature; so for the whole of that state it was fitting for some sacrament to be instituted.

247. But as to particulars, about whether several sacraments are fitting for the time of the same law, and which and how many, will be touched on below [nn.254-257]. Here a general question alone is asked about the time when, as about other conditions pertaining to the institution.

248. Hence it is plain that for the state of the fatherland no sacrament is fitting, because then man does not need sensible things to know intelligible things belonging to his salvation, nor does he then need to be exercised in seeking what belongs to salvation, because he has perfectly obtained salvation.

249. Also for the state of innocence it was not fitting for a sacrament to be instituted as it was after the fall, because although then man was not able to learn from sensible things [Ord. I d.3 nn.186-187], yet no sensible thing was then necessary for leading him to salvation so that it could, by removal of some impediment to salvation, be properly called a cure.

250. But whether marriage, which certainly existed in the state of innocence, was then a sacrament will be discussed later [d.26 n.11-12].

D. Whether Different Sacraments Needed to be Instituted

251. About the fourth point [n.223] one must first see how sacraments can be distinguished, and secondly turn to the point at issue.

1. How Sacraments can be Distinguished

252. On the first point, note that a sacrament is distinguished in one way as a term is into its significations, namely into sacrament properly said and sacrament improperly said. It is distinguished in another way as a higher class is into its lower kinds, and this in three ways. For since it is a sensible thing signifying something, it can be different sacraments because it can be different sensible things. Or it can be a different sacrament having a different signification, and that in two ways - either a simply different signification with respect to different signified things, or a signification different in a certain respect as regard a thing that varies as to more and less.

2. Response to the Issue at Hand

253. As to the issue at hand, I say that one can find in each Law a sacrament that is distinguished in the first way. For just as in each Law there was a sacrament properly speaking (from the third article [n.246]), so there was a sacrament improperly speaking -indeed many such sacraments improperly speaking, as genuflections, bowings, or prostrations on the ground and the like, which can be called ‘sacred signs’ generally and so ‘sacraments’ improperly. These and many others too could have been the same in the Mosaic Law and the Evangelical law.

254. But when talking of a sacrament properly speaking, I say that there ought to have been different ones in each Law; and this (setting aside the other sacraments) was fitting in respect of the sacrament instituted as medicine against the sickness of original sin.

255. For this sacrament had to be different by reason of the signification and by reason of the sensible thing instituted to do the signifying.

256. The proof of the first point is not indeed that it ought to be simply different with respect simply to the other Law. For, from the fact that there was medicine in each Law against the same disease, what was signified by such sacraments was not simply different in the different Laws, but the signification of the one had to be different with respect to the other as to variation of more and less. The proof is that ‘in the development of the human race the knowledge of truth increased’, as is plain from Gregory on Ezekiel 2.4 n.12 [cf. John 16.13, ‘When the Spirit of truth comes he will teach you all truth’]. Therefore, it was fitting that in the later Law the instituted sign signified more evidently the thing signified. Now the later Law was always more perfect, because God, who acts in orderly fashion, proceeds from the imperfect to the perfect. But a more perfect Law requires more perfect aids for its observance; therefore, the later Law had to have a sacrament signifying a more perfect grace. Therefore was it thus fitting that in the different laws there was a different signification, and a more manifest one in the later Law and in respect of the signified later thing.

257. From this follows that it was fitting for there to be sacraments different as to the sensible thing that did the signifying [n.255]. For it was more fitting (as to signifying a more perfect grace and for signifying it more manifestly) that a new sign was imposed than that the old one remained. For the old one was, from its imposition, in no way able to signify anything other than what it signified at first. But to impose the original sign or original sensible thing in the second Law for signifying something other than it signified before, or for signifying in another way, was not as fitting as to impose another sign, as is plain even in the case of practical signs imposed by us. For a new sign was more reasonable for signifying the more perfect effect among us, and because to impose a new sign was more manifest than again to impose the old one (which was first imposed for something else).

II. To the Initial Arguments

258. To the first argument [n.218] I say that God was not directly the cause or the occasion of idolatry. For he did not institute those sensible signs as if they were to be believed in or were something of the divine; but he instituted them as signs of the effects of his causing, from which signs the wayfarer could get knowledge and direction for seeking salvation.

259. To the second [n.219] the answer will appear below [n.395].

260. To the third [n.220] I say that no one other than God was the legislator, save as herald announcing the law, and he could thus have been an announcer of the sacraments of this Law but not an institutor.

261. To the fourth [n.221] the answer is plain from the fourth article [nn.256-257], that there were different sacraments instituted for the time of each Law. At least this is plain about the sacrament whereby the main distinction between Law and Law was made. For men of the same Law had to agree among themselves in that sacrament and be distinguished by it from those of the other Law [n.233].